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The embryonic stem cell research federal funding controversy has been 
the basis for a long-standing debate, arising from the ethical issues regarding the 
sanctity of human life debate—specifically the funding of the creation, use, and 
destruction of embryos for research purposes.  While it has been argued by 
many scientists that embryonic stem cell research would provide potentially 
immeasurable, profound, and lifesaving benefits to the health and well-being of 
mankind, there are nonetheless many opponents.  I maintain that the views of 
such opponents are not only unsubstantiated, but are even unethical, and that 
revising the current National Institute of Health guidelines is an obligation 
necessary to abide by bioethical principles.  
Embryonic stem cells are pluripotent, as opposed to adult stem cells which 
are of the more limited mulitpotent type.  This pluripotent ability allows embryonic 
stem cells to differentiate not only into the type of tissue they were derived from, 
as adult cells are often times limited to, but also to differentiate into any of the 
three germ layers, and therefore any kind of tissue and, consequently, any kind 
of stem cell, as well as the germ line. This malleable plurality is extremely 
important, especially because some organs, such as the lungs, kidneys, liver, 
and heart do not have adult stem cells of their own.  This makes embryonic stem 
cells indispensible not only to researchers, but to transplant recipients.  While 
some people argue that since induced pluripotent stem cells (which are adult 
cells that have been genetically altered, causing them to express genes the way 
an embryonic stem cell would) have many of the same qualities as embryonic 
stem cells—and should therefore replace embryonic stem cell use—they 
overlook significant discrepancies between the two.  There are still many 
uncertainties surrounding the capabilities of induced pluripotent stem cells, 
including whether or not they have the same capacity to differentiate into all cell 
types in a fully functional manner.  There is a chance they could resist complete 
differentiation due to cell memory.  This enormous shortcoming underscores the 
critical need for embryonic stem cell use.  
While the longstanding question of when life truly begins may be the heart 
of the debate, a utilitarian look at embryonic stem cell research, along with 
previous Supreme Court rulings, provides a compelling argument that using an 
embryo for research purposes contributes to—as opposed to violates—the 
sanctity of life.  When dealing with such controversial topics that affect so many 
people, a utilitarian perspective is the best way to decide which actions to take.  A 
utilitarian perspective produces the best option which “from all available 
alternatives, has the consequences which maximize the well-being of affected 
agents, i.e. the best action is that which produces the greatest improvement in 
well-being.” A utilitarian approach, Peter Singer argued, extends moral concern to 
all sentient creatures, which in the case of human embryonic stem cell research, 
is all of the people potentially benefitted from the treatments.  An embryo is not 
considered sentient because it is not yet a person that can feel or perceive (see 
II.a.ii. for more on embryos not yet qualifying as human).  A moral concern is not 
given to the embryos, because they should not, in fact, be considered sentient 
creatures, which I will address later.  If the benefits of the action(or gains in 
welfare) outweigh the costs of the action(or loss in welfare), then the action 
should be taken with respect to the whole.  Human embryonic research 
encompasses exactly this approach, and the governmental policy (and therefore 
NIH policy) should be based on maximizing benefits—utilitarianism is the best 
policy for public entities in a democracy.  
It is an insufficient defense for opponents to pit the viability of a five-day-
old embryo against the life-saving potential of embryonic stem cells and the 
ethical imperative to save a human life whenever possible.  The precious, 
potentially life-saving resources that are wasted while unused embryos are 
stored in fertility banks demonstrate an egregious ethical disgrace.  The number 
of lives that could be saved through well-funded research is more than ample 
reason for more lenient guidelines regarding the federal funding of embryonic 
stem cell research.  According to New York State Stem Cell Science, 
regenerative medicine can help repair cardiovascular damage and also has the 
potential to improve cancer treatments.  In fact, “diseases and afflictions that 
stand to be positively impacted by stem cell research including: stroke, 
respiratory disease, diabetes (respectively 3, 4 and 7 on the CDC list of causes 
of death), neurological disorders, spinal cord injuries, and some birth defects.”  
Medical research should be based on the principle of measured decisions that 
benefit the majority, while, by definition, causing no harm.  Those who disagree, 
using the “sanctity of life” premise, should consider this:  according to Raymond 
Devettere, author of Practical Decision Making in Health Care Ethics: Cases and 
Concepts, over one-third of zygotes fertilized naturally are lost within the first few 
days of their “life.”  He argues, then, that if each of these zygotes lost naturally 
are thought of as a tragic death, then using embryos for research would actually 
in fact be considered saving lives due to the fact that there is a much lower 
frequency of embryonic destruction in labs compared to that of natural 
fertilization.  
Although the presidential terms of Clinton, Bush, and Obama have 
brought some progressive changes and improvements in the NIH policy 
regarding embryonic stem cell research, it is still far too limiting, preventing 
research and medical solutions from reaching their full potential.  Clinton was the 
first to deal with the controversial topic supporting embryonic stem cell research 
on the grounds that he did not see it as a moral evil, but instead as an 
opportunity to help the sick.  However, his opinion did not correspond to existing 
legislation on the matter, also known as the Dickey Amendment.  Passed in 
Congress in 1995, the Dickey Amendment prohibited federal funding for both the 
creation of embryos made for research as well as any research leading to the 
destruction of the embryo.  Finding a small loophole in the wording of the 
amendment in 2000, Clinton attempted to uphold the integrity of the law while at 
the same time increasing federal funding of embryonic stem cell research, with 
an interpretation stating that as long as the embryos were not specifically harmed 
using federal funds, the stem cells would be eligible for funding.  For example, if 
private funds were used in the destruction of the embryo, the stem cells derived 
from the already destroyed embryo would then be fair game.  Many saw this is a 
sly way to ratify the destruction of embryos.  
When Bush took office, he found a sort of middle-ground that abided by 
both his moral and political principles and announced the policy that made 
federal funds eligible for embryonic stem cell research, but only to cell lines that 
had already been destroyed, taking the controversial life and death definition 
decision out of the equation.  Although some people were satisfied with this new 
policy, few cell lines existed at the time, and they came from limited ethnicities 
and were not genetically diverse, severely limiting research potential for various 
diseases.
President Obama removed the restriction Bush put into place prohibiting 
funding on new stem cell lines, and deemed that privately funded stem cell lines 
already created could be eligible for federal funding for further research.  
Although clearly a step in the right direction, the constraints on how federal 
money can be used to create new cell lines are still too restrictive.  
Opponents of federal funding suffer under the delusion that since not 
everyone in the country supports embryonic stem cell research, the government 
should not support it.  This argument is severely flawed.  It would be a difficult 
task to come up with a single thing that the government funds which everyone 
supports.  We live in a country where the majority rules.  Morality is, by its very 
definition, subjective and ambiguous.  Our laws cannot and should not be based 
on the unquantifiable and shifting authority of personal moralities.  The fact that 
sixty-eight percent—a clear majority—of Americans support embryonic stem cell 
research should be reason enough to increase federal funding and loosen 
guidelines.  We must no longer allow federal neutrality on such an important 
issue. 
Currently, the NIH guidelines are way too strict.  I propose a drastic 
change and rewrite of these regulations, as well as the contracts involved; from 
allowing made-for-research embryos eligible, to offering monetary incentives for 
donations of eggs/sperm.  Autonomy is essential for embryo donors, as it is for all 
living persons. Decisions regarding involvement in embryonic stem cell research 
need to originate from the most deliberate, informed, and utilitarian principles and 
sources.  I submit that the new, more lenient guidelines and the contracts for 
embryonic banks, healthcare providers, and research facilities will include 
evaluations in relation to what are, according to Insoo Hyun in his book Bioethics 
and the Future of Stem Cell Research, accepted requirements for ethical 
research:  beneficence, respect for persons, and justice.  The regulations that I 
propose will be in strict keeping with these ethical requirements. 
(Proposed) National Institute of Health Guidelines on Human Stem 
Cell Research:
Effective Date: These guidelines are effective on June 1, 2014
I. Scope of Guidelines:
a. These guidelines apply to the allocation of the National 
Institute of Health’s (NIH) funds for research involving human 
embryonic stem cells (hESCs) with the intended purpose of 
improving our understanding of human health and illness in 
order to prevent or treat disease.  They will not only pertain to 
hESCs harvested after the effective date, but to any pre-existing 
cell lines as well.  All research facilities, embryo banks, donors, 
and doctors involved in any federally funded research involving 
hESCs must follow any and all rules and regulations.
i. Why is public funding so important? Why not just 
leave it to the private sector and avoid the argument 
altogether?  There are many answers to these questions, 
most of which are related to perceived morality.  Those 
answers will be answered in the following guideline 
narratives.  The detail that requires no debate, however, 
is the fact that federal funding is much likelier to alleviate 
human suffering than private funding because it is better 
equipped to produce actual results.  In Dena Davis’ 
article Why Respect for the Human Embryo Requires 
Public Funding of Human Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research, the author discusses the benefits of public 
funding and makes the claim that “for-profit corporations 
are required by law to focus on maximizing profits for 
shareholders and are also driven to maximize their own 
corporate survival….  Public funding is focused on other 
goals.  The mission of the National Institute of Health, for 
example, is ‘to seek fundamental knowledge about the 
nature and behavior of living systems and the application 
of that knowledge to enhance, lengthen life, and reduce 
the burdens of illness and disability.’”  The NIH does not 
care about the “targeted patient base” or about the 
potential financial risks posed by undertaking the 
research, as the private sector does, because it does not 
have the pressure from investors and shareholders to 
make a profit.  (Davis)  Instead, it attempts to find cures 
for the diseases that plague people no matter their 
quantity or social status.  Further, public funding for and 
oversight of hESC research would better monitor ethics 
in research practices.  Much of the ethical debate centers 
on whether or not the stem cells from the embryos are 
derived in what is considered a respectful way.  
Proprietary procedures and decision-making standards 
are much more difficult to access and therefore oversee.  
If there were public money involved, researchers would 
have no choice but to make every decision and action 
subject to public scrutiny, ensuring both transparency and 
accountability, and therefore respect for the embryos.
*Guidelines are based on the current NIH guidelines and 
contain some of the same wording of claims when applicable.
II. Eligibility of Human Embryonic Stem Cells for NIH Funding: 
a. Stage of embryo
i. Stem cells derived from an embryo in the blastocyst 
stage of early development up to five days old are eligible 
for funding.  For the purpose of these guidelines, “human 
embryonic stem cells (hESCs) are cells that are derived 
from the inner cell mass of the blastocyst stage human 
embryos, are capable of dividing without differentiating 
for a prolonged period in culture, and are known to 
develop into cells and tissues of the three primary germ 
layers.  Although hESCs are derived from embryos, such 
stem cells are not themselves human embryos.”
ii. According to the Belmont Report, which was issued in 
1978 and was created by the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, there are three basic principles that 
one must use to justify actions as ethical.  Those three 
principles are:  respect for persons; beneficence; and 
justice.  
When justifying embryonic stem cell research, one 
must first understand that five-day old embryos are not and 
should not be considered persons.  A full, scientific 
understanding makes it evident that the embryo at this 
stage is not a person, and should therefore not be given 
the same moral status of one.  In his article “From the 
Micro to the Macro”, Thomas Shannon gives three reasons 
defending this view.  To begin, he explains that the cells at 
zygote and blastomere stages are totipotent or pluripotent, 
therefore the cells do not even “know” which part of the 
body they would even become.  Secondly, he points out 
that the organism is not even yet an individual and that “its 
cells can still be separated through twinning or divided 
through embryo division”.  Finally, he states that an embryo 
before differentiation is not a human life form but rather 
simply a biological expression of human nature.  
Essentially, unindividualized cells that happen to come 
from a human genome should not automatically be granted 
moral privilege.  They are not an individual being, and the 
research that could potentially be done on the stem cells 
derived would not be “research on a human person; it is 
research on human nature and in principle it is morally 
permissible”.  Further, the widely accepted principles of the 
United Kingdom’s Warnock Committee include the 
statement that the limit on embryo research should be at 
fourteen days after fertilization because prior “to the 
formation of the primitive streak, a human embryo in vitro is 
not yet a distinct individual but rather retains the biologic 
potential to fuse and divide into differential cellular 
masses.”  A five-day maximum, therefore, is arguably 
overly respectful and cautious.  It is not using human life as 
a means to an end.  Rather, this research is comparable to 
doing research on human body parts, a practice that is 
commonly accepted as being morally permissible.  
 The second principle, beneficence, is also exemplified 
when doing embryonic stem cell research.  Not only are 
people not harmed by this research, but by endeavoring to 
maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harm, as 
called out highlighted in the Belmont Report, a moral 
obligation is fulfilled.  It would unethical to not do the 
research.  The potential to improve and save so many lives 
proves ethical debate immaterial.  A government is 
obligated to do what is best for the majority of its people, 
as long as those actions do not violate autonomy or one’s 
right to make informed and un-coerced decisions.  
Governmental support of hESC research conforms to 
these parameters distinctly.  
The third principle of justice does not pertain to a 
blastocyst stage embryo because, as explained, it is not 
yet an individual.  However, it could certainly be argued 
that justice—which is defined as fairness or 
reasonableness in the way decisions are made, or the act 
of applying or upholding the law—will certainly be served 
by the utilitarian application of federal funding to effect, to 
the best of our ability, life-saving treatments for all citizens.
b. Unused in-vitro fertilization embryos: (See Appendix A)
i. Human embryonic stem cells derived from embryos 
that were created with the intention of being used for 
reproductive purposes using in-vitro fertilization that were 
voluntarily donated or sold by the individuals who sought 
said reproductive aid are eligible for federally funded 
research.  
1. If a couple has any intention of ever selling or 
donating their unused in-vitro embryos, before 
starting the process there must be an ironclad 
contract stipulating what exactly will happen to the 
embryos if the couple no longer expresses the 
same wishes.  The question of what to do with 
unused embryos is not a new one, and cases such 
as Davis v. Davis and Kass v. Kass are just a 
couple of examples of the predicaments that can 
occur when there is any indecisive language in a 
contract.  In my opinion, unlike the court involved 
in Kass v. Kass, the “intentions” of the donors are 
moot if the contract they signed contradicts them.  
While changes in circumstances may be relevant 
when a divorced couple is having a dispute 
regarding procreation, such changes should have 
no effect on the agreement to donate the embryos 
to research.  Another case, A.Z. v. B.Z. had similar 
conditions.  The couple signed a consent form 
stating that the wife would get the pre-embryos if 
the couple ever divorced.  When later the couple 
did indeed separate, the court had to get involved 
to decide whether or not the contract should be 
honored.  Among other findings, the court found 
that the contract was not meant to be between the 
two of them as well as the fact that there was no 
duration provision and therefore wasn’t 
enforceable.  I submit, however, that any contract 
involving the couples’ decisions as to what to do 
with the pre-embryos will be binding unless they 
both wish to retract the arrangement.  In addition, 
unless stated in the contract, the agreement will 
not only be valid and enforceable for a limited 
time.  The court’s decision that contract law has 
little bearing when it comes to reproductive 
technology cases is exactly the opposite of what 
their stance should have been—when dealing with 
such a controversial issue, contract law void of 
any indecisive clauses is the only way to ensure 
fair and legal regulation.
Take, for instance, the hypothetical couple 
John and Jane Smith.  John and Jane started 
the process of in-vitro fertilization and signed a 
contract that the unused embryos will be 
donated to research when they are either 
successful or decide to stop treatments.  Five 
years after they had a successful pregnancy, 
they decided to get a divorce.  Neither of them 
were able to use the embryos to procreate 
against the other ones wishes.  John then 
made it clear that his wish was to have the 
embryos destroyed.  Jane, however, did not 
agree and wanted to honor the contract and 
donate the unused embryos.  Without her 
concurrence to have them destroyed, John had 
no basis to take it to court because the contract 
had to be honored.
ii. One of the main Belmont Report principles—respect
—is carefully adhered to by deriving stem cells for 
research from unused zygote and blastomere embryos.  
In fact, the act of not using these embryos—wasting all of 
their potential for research—would be disrespectful.  
Respect literally means “to look again”.  In her book The 
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate: Science, Ethics, 
and Public Policy, author Karen Lebacqz submits that 
because embryos lack rational will and self-
determination, they instead deserve respect in a context 
other than that described by a Kantian personhood.  
Respect of embryos should be present, but it is a 
different type of respect than that deserved of people.  
Lebacqz makes the analogy to the respect deserved of 
animals.  It is not generally considered disrespectful to kill 
animals if we use them as food—a practical necessity 
which sustains life.  The same reasoning can and should 
be used to justify the use of an embryo to derive stem 
cells.  To squander the value of a thing is, according to 
Lebacqz, disrespectful.  This is exactly what happens 
when a perfectly good embryo, with the potential to help 
researchers and mankind, is thrown away instead of 
donated.   We cannot, in good conscience, allow the 
valuable, life-saving potential of these embryos to be 
destroyed.  The dismissal of this potential is disrespectful, 
rendering it unimportant.  If we believe an entity is worthy 
of respect, we should make every effort to ensure that 
there is purpose in the decision and the outcome.  Why 
should there be outright destruction, with no positive and 
impactful results?  “We should make every effort to 
ensure that its destruction is for morally important 
reasons, and with the best possible likelihood of 
success.”  In accordance with the Belmont Report’s 
systematic assessment of risks and benefits, the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission could not be more 
correct when they stated in their 1999 Stem Cell Report 
that the “lower probability of benefits from research uses 
of embryos is balanced by a much higher ratio of 
potential lives saved relative to embryonic lives lost.”  
Essentially, the NIH believes that “the embryo is entitled 
to ‘special respect,’ but may be used and destroyed in 
“worthwhile” research protocols.”
iii. If the law allows the private sector to do hESC 
research, then the debate cannot be entirely about 
morality.  It isn’t against the law; it is deemed appropriate 
if privately funded.  This “incoherent policy on health 
research”, as Suzanne Holland puts it in The Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Debate: Science, Ethics, and Public 
Policy, is about avoiding the obvious moral dichotomy in 
the law.  The National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(NBAC) in 1999, explained this, stating: “In the United 
States, moral disputes—especially those concerning 
practices in the area of human reproduction—are 
sometimes resolved by denying federal funding for those 
practices (e.g. elective abortions), while not interfering 
with the practice in the private sector.  In this case, 
investigative embryo research guided only by self-
regulation is a widespread practice in the private sector, 
and the ban on embryo research has served to 
discourage the development of a coherent public policy, 
not only regarding embryo research but also regarding 
health research more generally.”  I submit that this 
inconsistency of policy can be resolved.  For public policy 
on health research, anything that is legally allowable to 
the private sector should be accessible and supported by 
the public sector as well.  This would not only grant 
much-needed public support for essential medical 
research and practice, but also monitor possible ethical 
abuses.   
c. Full disclosure (See Appendix B)
i. The donors or sellers must be informed of the 
following:
1. All options available in the health care facility 
where treatment was sought pertaining to the 
embryos no longer needed for reproductive 
purposes.  
2. The extent of which the derived hESCs would 
be used for research.
3. The potential longevity of the derived hESCs.
4. The research will not necessarily lead to 
successful results;
5. What would happen to the embryos in the 
derivation of hESCs for research i.e. the 
procedures done, how they are used, etc.;
6. That hESCs derived from the embryos might 
be kept for many years and they cannot rescind 
their offer to allow the research to occur once 
research has begun;
7. The researcher obtaining the embryos may 
subsequently sell the derived stem cells to another 
researcher as long as there is no net profit for the 
original researcher (i.e. he/she does not sell it for 
more than he/she invested in it, including the price 
of the embryo in the case of a sale as well as any 
time and money invested during the derivation of 
the stem cells)
a. Although some may see this as 
controversial, there is no reason stem cells 
already derived from an embryo should be 
restricted for use by only one researcher.  
As long as the researcher is not profiting off 
of the sale of the stem cells derived, then 
the morally responsible thing to do would 
be to get the maximum use out of the 
embryo.
8. That the donation was made without any 
restriction or direction regarding the individuals(s) 
who may receive medical benefit from the use of 
the hESCs, such as who may be the recipients of 
cell transplants;
9. That the embryo will potentially be destroyed;
10. That the research was not intended to provide 
direct medical benefit to the donor(s) or seller(s) 
and they cannot request such treatment;
11. That the results of research using the hESCs 
may have commercial potential, and that the 
donor(s) would not receive any financial nor any 
other type of compensation;
12. Whether information that could identify the 
donor(s) would be available to the researchers 
and what type of information would be provided.
d.  Made for research embryos (See Appendices C and D)
i. The same disclosure and voluntary consent 
guidelines apply to the donor(s) or seller(s) of made for 
research embryos (seen above), as well as:
1. How much experience the doctor(s) have with 
the procedures being done.
2. The risks of all procedures as well as what will 
happen if complications occur.
ii. Currently, the guidelines and law in general refer to 
unused embryos that are going to be disposed of 
because they are no longer needed for reproduction.  
“The primary objection to creating embryos specifically 
for research is that there is a morally relevant difference 
between generating an embryo for the sole purpose of 
creating a child and producing an embryo with no such 
goal.”
  I submit that another class of embryos should be 
included for research potential:  Made-for-research 
embryos.  Made-for-research embryos would come from 
male and female sperm and egg sellers or donors and, 
after the appropriate consent and disclosure is given, the 
embryos produced would be eligible to be used for hESC 
research.  
There are many opponents to this idea, most of which 
adhere to the aforementioned “sanctity of life” argument.  
However, regarding those objections, the same defense 
used for leftover in-vitro embryos can be used for Made for 
Research embryos states in II.b.ii and iii.
Another flaw in the rationale of the opponents of 
public support is the failure to see that without strict, 
unbiased oversight, there is ample opportunity for violation.  
This is illustrated by Insoo Hyun in his book Bioethics and 
the Future of Stem Cell Research.  He cites “creative 
overestimation” when making embryos for in-vitro 
fertilization.  If a doctor or researcher simply overestimates 
how many embryos a couple would need for in-vitro 
fertilization, then there would be conveniently ample 
leftover embryos eligible for research.  What is the point of 
disallowing made-for-research embryos when the 
equivalent is impossible to enforce?  
The most obvious fault in the argument of the 
opposition is illuminated by the fact that morality is by 
definition subjective.  For those claiming that embryonic 
creation may have “immoral intentions,” I stand on reason.  
We cannot base the federal funding eligibility of blastocyst 
cells, stem cells that are scientific defined as NOT human 
embryos, on a subjective measure of emotion.  Morality is 
not science.  It is an elusive, intangible, variable, 
inconstant, personal point of view.
Not only is there not a good argument against made-
for-research embryos, but there enormously important 
arguments for them.  “First, it is possible that the creation 
of research embryos will provide the only way in which to 
conduct certain kinds of research, such as research into 
the process of human fertilization.  Second, as IVF 
techniques improve, it is possible that the supply of 
embryos for research from this source will dwindle.”   In 
2004, only 2.8 percent of the embryos that were currently 
in cyrostorage were designated to be donated to research.  
With such low amounts available to researchers, 
preventing the creation of Made for Research embryos is a 
distinct injustice to humanity.
e. Embryos sold for financial gain
i. Both made-for-research embryos and leftover 
embryos created for reproductive purposes can be sold 
to researchers by the individuals responsible for the 
embryo.  Said individuals would not be considered 
donors, but “sellers” of embryos.
1. The same disclosure and voluntary consent 
guidelines of made-for-research embryos apply to 
the seller(s) of the sold embryos
2. The monetary value of embryos must be 
consistent for all sellers in the same year, no 
matter the background of the biological parents.
3. The sellers do not have to be a couple—the 
egg and sperm can be donated individually
4. Donors responsible for already created cell 
lines are not eligible for compensation.
ii. Paying people for their embryos, both leftover from in-
vitro fertilization as well as made-for-research, should be 
included in the expanded guidelines for hESC research 
federal funding eligibility, based on the premise that our 
country functions on a market economy; selling a thing 
that one owns in its entirety is a basic right.  An exception 
prompts the argument that this is equivalent to selling an 
organ, which is illegal.  However, this argument is 
invalidated by the fact that donating an organ can be 
detrimental to one’s own health, while donating an egg or 
sperm is not.  Further, it is not illegal for women or men to 
sell their eggs or sperm for reproductive purposes.  
Everything that goes into producing an egg or sperm also 
goes into producing an embryo.  As such, precedent has 
been set.  
Oftentimes, more affluent, educated white women are 
of higher demand when it comes to egg donations 
compared to women of lower social status.  
Adversaries of the concept of paying for eggs or 
embryos may make the argument that “[e]ggs 
destined for laboratory research could be viewed as 
disposable and therefore likely to command far less 
than eggs used for implantation”, leaving the “eggs of 
non-Caucasian, less-educated, non-affluent women” 
to be of less value and therefore marginalizing such 
women.  However, it is patently obvious that our laws 
do not follow this speculative line of reasoning.  Under 
the above hypothesis, low-wage jobs that are less 
appealing and even dangerous, which may also target 
non-Caucasian, less-educated, non-affluent women, 
should be considered “coercive.”  But they are simply 
jobs.  They put bread on the table.  Financial impetus 
has no basis in determining the “correctness” of a 
practice.  Further, putting the process under the 
sponsorship of the public sector would provide 
oversight to the fee and payment structure, ensuring 
fair, equal, and reliable financial transactions.  In 
addition, in the case of unused in-vitro fertilization 
embryos, the couple would have had to invest large 
sums of money throughout the entire process.  Why 
should they not be able to defray some of those costs 
with compensation from a researcher?  
iii. Paying people for human research is not a new 
concept—in fact, paying people for stem cell research is 
not even a new concept.  In June of 2009, the Empire 
State Stem Cell Board in New York decided to allow stem 
cells that were derived from embryos of which the 
oocytes had been paid for to be eligible for state funding.  
They stated that the donor could be paid for the 
“expense, time, burden and discomfort” or out of pocket 
expenses related to the donation process, as long as the 
oocytes were in excess of the in-vitro fertilization 
process.  Their reasoning, similar to that of which I stated 
above, is because the guidelines mandate that all 
payments made for oocytes for research must equivocate 
to the payments given for an oocyte for reproductive 
purposes.  Regarding their decision, the board stated:  
“Sources of recently-harvested oocytes are necessary for 
certain stem cell research pursuing medical advances to 
alleviate pain and suffering by people afflicted with 
debilitating and life-threatening diseases. Experiences in 
other jurisdictions indicate that lack of reasonable 
compensation to women who donate their oocytes to 
stem cell research has created a significant impediment 
to such donation, limiting the progress of stem cell 
research.  Accordingly, over the past year, the ESSCB 
has intensively examined and discussed the issue of 
whether it is ethically appropriate to provide women who 
donate their oocytes to stem cell research with any form 
of reimbursement, in recognition of the considerable 
financial and physical burdens associated with the 
donation process.”  Ethical issues that are then 
addressed include limiting financial recompense to 
prevent the possibility of coercion—there are no 
additional risks nor differing payment policies when 
donating to research compared to donating for 
reproductive purposes—as well as what is arguably most 
important issue:  that “donating oocytes to stem cell 
research arguably confers a greater benefit to society 
than does oocyte donation for private reproductive use.”  
Although an oocyte is not an embryo, these same 
justifications can apply when taking into account the 
qualities of zygote and blastomere cells.
f.  Voluntary consent 
i. Informed voluntary consent free of coercion must be 
given by all donor(s) or seller(s).  
1. Both parties responsible for the creation of the 
embryo must give their full voluntary consent, 
which means signatures on any documentation 
necessary, including a universal consent form for 
all donations/sales which must be obtained either 
prior to donation or prior to the commencement of 
any research done to the embryo and stem cells 
derived from that embryo.  
a. All documentation involved must be free 
of exculpatory language, which is defined 
by the Department of Health and Human 
Services section 45 CFR 46.116 as: “No 
informed consent, whether oral or written, 
may include any exculpatory language 
through which the subject is made to waive 
or appear to waive any of the subject's legal 
rights, or releases or appears to release the 
investigator, the sponsor, the institution, or 
its agents from liability for negligence.” 
2. In the case of a donated egg/sperm in order to 
create the embryo, stipulations of the agreement 
of the donation regarding the donated element 
before the donation or sale will be honored.  
Donors or sellers must be informed that they retain 
the right to withdraw consent for the donation [or 
sale] of the embryo until the embryos are actually 
used to derive embryonic stem cells or until 
information which could link the identity of the 
donor(s) or seller(s) with the embryo is no longer 
retained, if applicable.  
3. Policies and/or procedures are in place at the 
healthcare facility where the embryos are donated 
ensuring that neither consenting nor refusing to 
donate embryos for research will affect the quality 
of care provided to potential donor(s).  
ii. The complexity of the voluntary process is inherent 
and a vitally important factor.  All possible measures will 
be taken to ensure that the process is consistent and fair 
for all, and unequivocally voluntary.  The contracts 
provided will be universally adopted and loophole-free, to 
the utmost possible extent.  As long as these guidelines 
are met, then the hESCs from those embryos would be 
eligible for federal funding. 
 Three opposing claims I am compelled to address 
are:   coercion by guilt being; coercion by providing the 
donor or seller with all options; and accepting donations or 
sales from marginalized people such as the poor and 
persons of color.  To begin with, guilt, like morality, is a 
subjective, often fleeting, and even whimsical emotion.  To 
pit scientific argument against such an ephemeral factor is 
irrational.  Consider the premise from the opposite 
perspective:  Donors may feel guilt if they do not donate or 
sell their embryos.  Should this be an impediment to the 
terms of acceptance?  Is it coercive to allow people the 
freedom to follow their hearts?   Secondly, some critics 
claim that “potential donors should be asked to provide 
embryos for research only if they have decided to have 
those embryos discarded instead of donating them to 
another couple or storing them.”  I maintain that this 
criticism in not only unreasonable but unethical.  It is taking 
a moral high-ground—a presumption of moral superiority in 
deciding the motivational correctness on behalf of others.  
By not allowing people to consider all options, the 
government disregards individual philosophy and preempts 
personal choice.  Beyond this, it outright robs those in 
desperate need of stem cells, costing untold damage in the 
tolls of sickness and death.  Lastly, there is the claim that 
“the poor, who are largely female, and most persons of 
color will simply be marginalized from these therapies, 
even as it is possible that their eggs are commercialized 
downstream for profit”.  This claim no longer holds up as it 
once may have.  While being poor is ground enough to be 
considered a coercive factor in donating eggs, and while 
plenty of poor people have donated blood for financial gain, 
successful healthcare reform is on the horizon with the 
goal of aiding these ever-marginalized populations so that 
these very women will be able to include themselves in the 
ranks of those benefitting from the potential medical 
advances of stem cell research.
g. Somatic Cell Nucleus Transfer
i. Human embryonic stem cells derived from eligible 
sources are eligible for NIH funding if, when introduced 
into non-human primate blastocysts, those blastocysts 
are not involved in the breeding of animals with human 
cells contributing to the germ cell line.
h. Embryos that have undergone PGD
i. Embryos that have undergone Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis are eligible for NIH funding as long as 
the couple was in no way coerced to donate or sell the 
embryo based on the knowledge acquired of any 
recessive diseases or any other condition that may make 
the embryo more valuable for research.  
1. In fact, these embryos would arguably me even 
more ethically accepted to derive stem cells from 
due to the fact that the embryos with the recessive 
diseases would not wanted in the first place and 
would have inevitably been destroyed.
i. Donations outside the United States
i. Applicants seeking NIH funding for embryos donated 
outside of the United States may submit an assurance 
that the stem cells derived from the embryos fully comply 
with all guidelines, including all NIH contracts associated 
with the donated embryos.  Seemingly equivalent foreign 
procedural guidelines and contracts will not be accepted.
ii. Embryos sold, not donated, outside of the United 
States will not be eligible for NIH funding because of the 
uncertainty of the extent of coercion taking place in other 
countries, specifically towards impoverished women.  
iii. When dealing with such a controversial and highly 
regulated topic, allowing unidentical guidelines from 
countries other than the country making such laws would 
be unethical due to the inability to regulate the validity 
behind the claims.  
j. Grandfathering in policies
i. All hESCs derived prior to these guidelines are put 
into effect are automatically eligible for federal funding, 
no further review would be necessary. 
k. Researcher and physician requirements
III. IRB Review: hESC Oversight
a. Ensuring adequate oversight
i. The U.S. Senate passed the National Research Act of 
1974 when there became “widespread public revelations 
of exploitive scientific studies using vulnerable 
populations, such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and 
the Willowbrook State School hepatitis study.”  The 
significance of the act was that it mandated that anyone 
doing research on human subjects that applied for a 
federal grant would have to be reviewed by a committee 
called the Institutional Review Board.  In addition, a 
group was assembled to identify what basic ethical 
principles should be maintained when doing research on 
human subjects.  This report later became known as the 
Belmont Report.  Both of these reports have become the 
cornerstone of ethics when dealing with any research of 
human subjects.  
ii. According to the Health and Human Services Code of 
Federal Regulations Title 45 Public Welfare Part 46 
“Protection of Human Subjects”, there are strict 
regulations when such research is being done.  There are 
extensive guidelines explaining regulations regarding any 
and all research involving human subjects, including strict 
Institutional Review Board procedures, which ensure the 
subjects are not being violated.  
The policy, which “applies to all research involving 
human subjects conducted, supported, or otherwise 
subject to regulation by any federal department or 
agency which takes appropriate administrative action to 
make the policy applicable to such research,” outlines all 
aspects of human research, ranging from IRB 
membership to research involving neonates.  As far as 
the regulations that are applicable to hESC research, 
with the assumption that the research is technically being 
done on the man and woman involved in giving the 
embryos, they prove that there is no violation of the 
protection of human research subjects as long as the 
researchers and research facilities abide by the 
guidelines set forth, which, as stated in the policy, must 
be heavily regulated by an IRB.  In order to review the 
research being done, the IRB has the power to “review 
and have authority to approve, require modifications in 
(to secure approval), or disapprove all research activities 
covered by this policy.”  In order for the IRB to then 
approve the research, all of the following requirements 
must be satisfied:
1. Risks to the subject are minimized
2. Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to 
anticipated benefits
3. Selection of subjects is equitable
4. Informed consent is sought from every subject 
involved
5. No coercion or undue influence has been put on a 
subject
The federal regulations code explicitly states that 
“federal funds administered by a department or agency may 
not be expanded for research involving human subjects 
unless requirements of this policy have been satisfied,” and 
because all of the above requirements are also mandatory 
according to the guidelines, it is evident that the loosened 
guidelines are more than acceptable.
b. Monitoring and enforcement actions
i. Penalties for researchers 
1. If all guidelines are not strictly followed, 
researchers are subject to losing all current and 
future federal funding
ii. Penalties for doctors 
1. If all guidelines are not strictly followed, doctors 
are subject to losing their license
c. All protocols involving deriving hESCs must be reviewed and 
subsequently approved by the Institutional Review Board 
d. A National Stem Cell oversight and review panel should be 
established for a fixed period of time and should be responsible 
for (based on NBAC 1999 recommendations):
1. Reviewing protocols for the derivation of 
hESCs and approve those that meet the 
requirements described; 
2. Certifying hESC lines that result from approved 
protocols;
3. Maintaining a public registry of approved 
protocols and certified hESC lines;
4. Establishing a database—linked to the public 
registry—consisting of information submitted by 
federal research sponsors that includes all 
protocols that derive or use hESCs;
5. using the database and other appropriate 
sources to track the history and ultimate use of 
certified cell lines as an aid to policy assessment 
and formulation;
6.  Establishing requirements for and provide 
guidance to sponsoring agencies on the social and 
ethical issues that should be considered in the 
review of research protocols that derive or use 
hESCs;
7. Reporting at least annually to the DHHS 
Secretary with an assessment of the current state 
of the science for both the derivation and use of 
human embryonic stem cells. 
ii. With good reason, oversight of hESC research is of 
utmost importance.  In fact, it was one of the two 
limitations the NBAC stated in their 1999 letter to 
President Clinton regarding their recommendations about 
hESC research.  “A national mechanism to review 
protocols for deriving human ES and EG cells and to 
monitor research using such cells would ensure strict 
adherence to guidelines and standards across the 
country.”  With this national mechanism, which would 
enforce the policies taken from the NBAC stated in 
III.c.iii.1-7, the NIH would be able to ensure the research 
being done was both responsible and ethical, following 
the guidelines set forth.
e. Ineligibility for funding
i. Federal funding of the derivation of stem cells from 
human embryos in order to conduct research solely for 
the purpose of non-life altering or threatening conditions 
(i.e. for cosmetic purposes) is prohibited.
ii. Any stem cells derived from an embryo that does not 
meet all requirements are not eligible for federal funding
IV. Dickey Amendment
a. Loosening the guidelines for funding is further justified upon 
examination of the legislation responsible for such strict 
policies.  In 1995, Congress passed a bill introduced by 
Representative Jay Dickey with a rider attached called the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment.  It essentially states that the 
Department of Health and Human Services cannot appropriate 
funds for the creation of human embryos, nor can they use the 
funds in research in which the embryos are destroyed, including 
NIH funding.  The amendment reads:
SEC. 509. (a) None of the funds made available in this Act may be used for--
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or 
(2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or 
knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for 
research on fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 46.204(b) and section 498(b) of the 
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 289g(b)). 
(b) For purposes of this section, the term `human embryo or embryos' includes 
any organism, not protected as a human subject under 45 CFR 46 as of the date 
of the enactment of this Act, that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, 
cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes or human diploid 
cells.
This amendment should be abolished for a number of reasons.  
Most importantly, however, it should be abolished because a law of this 
much import and significance should not be based on such an 
ambiguously worded technicality—that is, whether it refers to stem cell 
research or embryo research.  A case that clearly illustrates the ambiguity 
of this section of the amendment is Sherley v. Sebelius.  In the case, 
Sherley argued that the “NIH guidelines violate existing federal law 
banning the use of federal funds for the destruction of human embryos.” 
Professor Dena Davis, in her article “Not with a Bang, but a Whimper: 
Sherley v. Sebelius”, explains that the case is riddled with “arcane points 
of law and procedure.”  Firstly, scientists Sherley and Deisher were 
attempting to sue on behalf of the embryos which caused the case to be 
dismissed by the district court due to lack of standing.  The District of 
Columbia Circuit Court then reversed this ruling, giving the researchers 
themselves standing due to their stake in research competition.  Once 
Sherley and Deisher were finally able to take the issue to court, however, 
the confusion only continued, as the term “research” was then debated.  
Eventually the ruling held that hESC research does not harm embryos, as 
Judge Brown, the presiding judge in the case, articulated the obvious 
problem: “’Given the weighty interests at stake in this encounter between 
science and ethics, relying on an increasingly Delphic, decade-old single 
paragraph rider on an appropriations bill hardly seems adequate’”.  An 
amendment with such vague and subjective language should be discarded.  
Further, I submit that it need not even be replaced, as long as the hESC 
research being done is in accordance with the proposed NIH guidelines 
and all of the above requirements are met. 
V. Obtaining federal funding
a. Researchers using hESCs obtained after the effective date 
of these guidelines that comply with all of the criteria are 
automatically eligible to apply
b. Any researchers using hESCs obtained before the effective 
date of these guidelines that comply with all of the criteria are 
automatically eligible to apply
c. Any researchers using hESCs obtained before the effective 
date of these guidelines that do not comply with all of the criteria 
may establish eligibility by submitting all materials to a Working 
Group of the Advisory Committee to the Director, which will 
make recommendations regarding the eligibility for NIH funding 
to its parent group, the ACD.  The ACD will make 
recommendations to the NIH Director, who will make final 
decisions about eligibility for NIH funding.
Conclusion:
In order to demonstrate the increased flexibility of the proposed 
guidelines, let us consider two hypothetical human embryonic stem cell lines.  
The first stem cell line was derived from a leftover embryo a couple did not need 
for their in-vitro fertilization treatment—they only wanted one child and were 
successful on the first try.  They both have a rare recessive gene for a disease 
that many researchers have been trying to find out more about, so the stem cells 
were potentially extremely valuable for research.   The couple, who loosely 
morally opposed embryonic stem cell research, decided to sell the leftover 
embryos to a researcher because the incentive of getting monetary 
compensation outweighed their moral opposition. Because of the ability to sell 
the embryos, extremely useful embryos that would have otherwise been 
disposed of were put to good use.  The price was mutually agreed upon and all 
consent forms and contracts were fully understood and signed.  
The second stem cell line was derived from an embryo that was created 
in-vitro after a man donated his sperm and a woman donated her eggs, 
independent of each other.  They did so with the intent of the embryo being used 
for research purposes because they wanted to help the research and medical 
communities any way they could.  No coercion took place, and all consent forms 
and contracts necessary were fully understood and signed before the process 
began.  A hESC researcher then obtained the embryo and derived stem cells 
from it.
If considering the hypothetical stem cell lines with the current guidelines 
as mandatory criterion, the working group of the Advisory Committee to the 
Director (ACD) would have found these stem cell lines ineligible for federal 
funding.  In fact, in the past the ACD has found lines ineligible for much less 
obviously substantial reasons, including undated protocols, lack of fully informed 
consent when the withdrawal information was in question, consent forms 
containing exculpatory language, etc.  If the new proposed guidelines are strictly 
followed and the contracts provided are used, however, no such issues would 
occur.  Further, with significantly reduced restrictions ranging from sales of 
zygotes to made-for-research embryos, there would be considerably fewer 
reasons to deny federal funding.  
To put it simply, with these new guidelines, many more human embryonic 
stem cell lines would be eligible for research, and therefore there would be that 
many more opportunities for research breakthroughs and subsequent medical 
advancements.  Who doesn’t want that?
Appendix A:
EMBRYO DONATION AGREEMENT/CONTRACT FOR DONATION OR SALE 
OF LEFTOVER IN VITRO FERTILIZATION EMBRYOS TO HESC 
RESEARCH ELIGIBLE FOR FEDERAL FUNDING 
(Based on contract from Miracleswaiting.org)
THIS AGREEMENT (“the Agreement”) is made as of the date set forth below 
by and between NAME OF DONOR/SELLER 1 and NAME OF DONOR/
SELLER 2, RESEARCH FACILITY DIRECTOR, human embryonic research 
program director. From here on, the embryo donors (or in the case of a sale, 
sellers) shall sometimes be referred to herein as “the Does” or “Donors” and 
the research director as “the Recipient”, or “Rec”.
RECITALS:
The MALE DONOR and FEMALE DONOR desire to donate NUMBER OF 
EMBRYOS DONATED leftover cryopreserved embryos to RECIPIENT, unused 
after in vitro fertilization success and/or decision to stop treatments ; and
WHEREAS, RECIPIENT desires to receive the NUMBER OF EMBRYOS 
cryopreserved embryos from the Does for use in human embryonic stem cell 
research; and
WHEREAS, the Rec is working with STATE DOCTORS AND MEDICAL 
CLINICS INVOLVED regarding the medical procedures involved with the in 
Appendix B:
Consent Form for donating/selling embryo for research:
Before donating or selling an embryo, the following requirements in accordance 
with IRB stipulations should be understood:
  All options available for the unused embryos in the health care facility 
where treatment is being sought were explained to the individual(s) who 
sought reproductive treatment; the health care facility has made it clear 
that donating or lack thereof will in no way affect the treatment provided.  
No coercion of any kind took place.
  Clear instructions were given regarding the fate of the embryos in the 
event of changes in circumstances (i.e. death, divorce, etc.)
  When donating to federally funded human embryonic stem cell research, 
you will not be provided with any information regarding the research done
  Cells or tissue developed from the embryos may be used at some future 
time for human transplantation research
  Cells or tissues derived from the embryos may be kept indefinitely and 
only before any stem cells have been derived from the embryo can you 
rescind your offer to donate the embryo to hESC research 
  If the research done from the derived stem cells from the embryos obtains 
any commercial value at any point, you will not be entitled nor will you 
receive any form of payment, monetary or otherwise
  You may contact the research clinic involved regarding any pertinent 
questions about the research or the research subjects’ rights
  The researcher has the right to sell the derived stem cells as long as there 
is no net-profit from doing so
  You may be asked to undergo psychological testing before donating/
selling
  In the case of made-for-research embryos, you understand the risks 
associated with the necessary procedures
  The research performed on these frozen embryos is not intended to 
provide direct medical benefit to you
  The embryo will not be involved in cloning
  All contracts involved must be signed by you or, if applicable, both parties
  You are entitled to having a lawyer look over all documents before signing 
anything
  The donation/sale is completely voluntary
  While most aspects of the process will be kept confidential, if stem cells 
are later derived from the embryo, researchers could be privy to your 
information regarding any familial diseases or recessive genes, although 
your identity will be kept confidential
  If you are selling rather than donating, the price set must be equal to the 
set price of that year.  Make sure you agree upon a method of payment 
beforehand.  If the payment is agreed upon outside of the program, we 
cannot enforce the agreement
  If you agreed upon compensation and the embryo does not end up getting 
used in research, you are still entitled to the full compensation
  You must pay taxes on the compensation you receive
Donor 1 Signature Date
Donor 2 Signature Date
Appendix C:
EMBRYO DONATION AGREEMENT/CONTRACT FOR DONATION OR SALE 
OF MADE-FOR-RESEARCH EMBRYOS TO HESC RESEARCH ELIGIBLE 
FOR FEDERAL FUNDING 
(Based on contract from Miracleswaiting.org)
THIS AGREEMENT (“the Agreement”) is made on the date set forth below by 
and between NAME OF DONOR/SELLER 1 and NAME OF DONOR/SELLER 
2, RESEARCH FACILITY DIRECTOR, the human embryonic research 
program director. From here on, the embryo donors (or in the case of a sale, 
sellers) shall sometimes be referred to as “the Does” or “Donors” and the 
research director as “the Recipient”, or “Rec”.
RECITALS:
The MALE DONOR and FEMALE DONOR desire to donate NUMBER OF 
EMBRYOS DONATED made-for-research embryos; and
Whereas the RECIPIENT desires to receive the NUMBER OF EMBRYOS 
cryopreserved embryos from the Does for use in human embryonic stem cell 
research; and
Whereas, the Rec is working with STATE DOCTORS AND MEDICAL CLINICS 
INVOLVED regarding the medical procedures involved with the donation or 
sale; and
Appendix D:
EGG/SPERM DONATION AGREEMENT/CONTRACT FOR DONATION OR 
SALE OF MADE-FOR-RESEARCH EMBRYOS TO HESC RESEARCH 
ELIGIBLE FOR FEDERAL FUNDING 
(Based on contract from Miracleswaiting.org)
THIS AGREEMENT (“the Agreement”) is made on the date set forth below by 
and between NAME OF DONOR/SELLER  and RESEARCH FACILITY 
DIRECTOR, the human embryonic research program director. From here on, 
the egg/sperm donor (or in the case of a sale, seller) shall sometimes be 
referred to as “the Doe” or “Donor” and the research director as “the Recipient”, 
or “Rec”.
RECITALS:
The DONOR desires to donate AMOUNT DONATED eggs/sperm; and
Whereas the RECIPIENT desires to receive the AMOUNT DONATED sperm/
eggs from the Doe for use in human embryonic stem cell research; and
Whereas, the Rec is working with STATE DOCTORS AND MEDICAL CLINICS 
INVOLVED regarding the medical procedures involved with the donation or 
sale; and
Whereas, the Doe promise to give all rights to the egg/sperm to the Rec as 
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